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FYI TO THE FAA ON FLL:  
APPROVAL OF A RUNWAY EXTENSION  
IN CITY OF DANIA BEACH 
Sara Mattern* 
Abstract: The Airport and Airway Improvement Act requires the Federal 
Aviation Administration to review project applications for airport devel-
opment projects. Under the Act, FAA must prioritize a more environmen-
tally preferable alternative unless it is not prudent. In City of Dania Beach v. 
FAA, the court upheld the agency’s definition of prudent, although it dif-
fered from the Supreme Court’s definition of the word under the De-
partment of Transportation Act in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe. 
This Comment argues that the case law on administrative deference sup-
ports the court’s decision and that a general scheme of regulatory flexi-
bility will be environmentally beneficial. 
Introduction 
 Fort Lauderdale Hollywood-International Airport (FLL), owned by 
Broward County, Florida, increasingly experiences delays and conges-
tion.1 The airport is a large hub and has the 22nd largest yearly passen-
ger traffic of any U.S. airport.2 In a 2004 study, the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) identified FLL as one of the thirty-five busiest air-
ports in the United States.3 Another FAA study in 2007 recognized the 
need for additional capacity at FLL by 2015.4 
 After reviewing a 2005 project grant application from Broward 
County to improve airport capacity, FAA approved a development plan 
 
* Staff Writer, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2011–12. 
1 City of Dania Beach v. FAA, 628 F.3d 581, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
2 FAA, National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems (NPIAS) (2011–2015) 23 
(2010), available at http://www.faa.gov/airports/planning_capacity/npias/reports/media/ 
2011/npias_2011_narrative.pdf; Statistics, Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood Int’l Airport, 
http://www.broward.org/AIRPORT/ABOUT/Pages/Statistics.aspx. 
3 FAA et al., Airport Capacity Benchmark Report 2004, at 6 (2004), available at 
http://www.faa.gov/airports/airport_development/omp/funding/PFC_06–19-C—00-ORD_ 
ADMIN_REC/MEDIA/DOC-032.pdf. 
4 FAA, Capacity Needs in the National Airspace System 2007–2025, at 41–42 
(2007), available at http://www.faa.gov/airports/resources/publications/reports/media/ 
fact_2_appendices.pdf. 
70 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 39: E. Supp. 
that would extend one of the airport’s existing runways.5 FAA approved 
an alternative that would better reduce delays and improve capacity 
after determining that a more environmentally preferable option to 
build a new runway was not prudent under the relevant statute.6 
 Tasked with overseeing the development and improvement of U.S. 
airports by Congress, FAA must consider the environmental impact of 
airport development projects, including a runway construction or ex-
tension.7 Pursuant to the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 
(AAIA), FAA may approve a project grant application with a “significant 
adverse effect on natural resources . . . only after finding that no possi-
ble and prudent alternative to the project exists . . . .”8 In reviewing the 
environmental impacts of proposed alternatives, FAA also must ensure 
the project will increase passenger and cargo capacity and decrease de-
lays.9 
 Although a term such as “prudent” may be ambiguous, petitioners 
in City of Dania Beach v. FAA challenged FAA’s interpretation of the 
term, arguing its definition was controlled by the Supreme Court’s 
definition of “prudent” in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe.10 The 
majority’s decision to allow FAA to use its more lax definition of “pru-
dent” permits a slightly more environmentally damaging alternative in 
this case.11 Avoiding development of rigid statutory definitions of ar-
guably vague words, however, will likely benefit environmental protec-
tions more generally.12 By promoting regulatory flexibility, agencies can 
develop more tailored project evaluations based on their expertise in 
the field.13 
                                                                                                                      
5 City of Dania Beach, 628 F.3d at 583, 590. 
6 Id. at 583, 591. 
7 49 U.S.C. § 47106(c)(1) (2006); see FAA, Record of Decision: The Development 
and Expansion of Runway 9R/27L and Other Associated Airport Projects at Fort 
Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport Broward County, Florida 9–10 
(2008), available at http://www.faa.gov/airports/environmental/records_decision/media/ 
rod_fll09_main.pdf [hereinafter ROD]. 
8 49 U.S.C. § 47106(c)(1)(B). 
9 See 49 U.S.C. § 47101(a). 
10 See City of Dania Beach, 628 F.3d at 584. 
11 See id. at 583. 
12 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83 
(2005). 
13 See id. 
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I. Facts and Procedural History 
 As early as 1996, Broward County worked with FAA to develop an 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for a runway extension.14 Al-
though FAA and Broward County conducted evaluations and examined 
the possibility for airport expansion numerous times, a 2005 EIS pro-
vided the basis for the alternatives debated in City of Dania Beach.15 
 Currently, FLL has three runways: two running parallel east to west 
and a third connecting the two diagonally.16 Broward County brought 
its petition to FAA after determining that extending the southern run-
way and decommissioning the diagonal runway would meet its goals of 
additional capacity and decreased delay.17 The county’s preferred ex-
pansion plan became Alternative B1c, one of a number of alternatives 
considered by FAA in its review.18 
 After public meetings, workshops, and reviewing public comments, 
FAA released a final EIS evaluating the proposed alternatives in June 
2008 and a Record of Decision in December 2008.19 Both documents 
favored Alternative B1b, which contained the same physical characteris-
tics as Broward County’s proposed option—Alternative B1c—but in-
cluded different noise mitigation actions.20 Alternative B1b would de-
stroy 15.41 acres of wetlands, including 3.05 acres of mangrove wet-
land.21 Despite the presence of the more environmentally friendly 
Alternative C1—which would destroy 15.40 acres of wetlands, but spare 
mangrove wetlands—FAA determined its adoption to be imprudent 
under § 47106(c)(1)(B) of the AAIA.22 FAA also found that neither 
option implicated the resources covered by § 4(f) of the Department of 
Transportation Act discussed in Overton Park.23 
 The cities of Dania Beach and Hollywood, Florida—both south of 
FLL—participated in the comment process, opposing the adoption of 
Alternative B1b, which would extend the southernmost runway and 
                                                                                                                      
14 City of Dania Beach v. FAA, 628 F.3d 581, 590 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 583. 
17 See id. at 583, 588. 
18 ROD, supra note 7, at 11. 
19 Id. at 85–86 
20 Id. at 13, 36, 51. 
21 Id. at 28. 
22 See 49 U.S.C. § 47106(c)(1)(B) (2006); ROD, supra note 7, at 9–10, 47–48. 
23 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe (Overton Park), 401 U.S. 402, 404 
(1971); ROD, supra note 7, at 27–28, 32. 
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allow larger commercial aircraft to use the airport.24 Instead, the cities 
preferred Alternative C1, which required constructing a new runway 
north of the existing runways.25 Dania Beach challenged FAA’s dis-
missal of Alternative C1 in its comments on the 2008 EIS, contending 
that because the environmentally preferred alternative met the project 
purposes and need, FAA should adopt it based on environmental and 
cost considerations.26 In its response, FAA defended selection of a more 
environmentally damaging alternative.27 While Alternative C1 could be 
a reasonable alternative that potentially met the project’s purpose and 
need, FAA noted it would result in the lowest practical capacity and 
highest delays of all options considered.28 
 Unable to convince FAA to adopt Alternative C1 through adminis-
trative channels, the cities of Dania Beach and Hollywood, and a num-
ber of individuals, filed petitions for review of FAA’s grant of approval 
in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.29 In 
their complaint, petitioners challenged FAA’s decision to dismiss Alter-
native C1 as imprudent under § 47106(c)(1)(B).30 
 Petitioners claimed such a finding was barred by the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the term “prudent” in Overton Park.31 They 
reasoned the term should have the same meaning under both 
§ 47106(c)(1)(B) and § 4(f) of the Department of Transportation 
(DOT) Act.32 If the two uses of the word had the same definition, only 
“truly unusual factors” would allow FAA to find an option impru-
dent.33 The petitioners also relied on FAA’s own regulations regarding 
EISs that seemed to define “prudent” using language indicating a 
high bar for finding an option imprudent.34 
                                                                                                                      
24 ROD, supra note 7, at 101; see FAA, Record of Decision: The Development and 
Expansion of Runway 9R/27L and other associated airport projects at Fort 
Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport, Appendix A—Comments Received 
& FAA Responses on the Final EIS, at A.3–1, 4–6 (2008), available at http://www.faa. 
gov/airports/environmental/records_decision/media/rod_fll09_Appendix_a_index_9.pdf 
[hereinafter Appendix A]. 
25 City of Dania Beach, 628 F.3d at 583. 
26 Appendix A, supra note 24, at A.3–9. 
27 City of Dania Beach, 628 F.3d at 588. 
28 ROD, supra note 7, at 46–47; see City of Dania Beach, 628 F.3d at 588. 
29 City of Dania Beach, 628 F.3d at 583. 
30 Id. at 584. 
31 Id. at 584, 586. 
32 Id. at 586. 
33 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 413; City of Dania Beach, 628 F.3d at 586. 
34 See City of Dania Beach, 628 F.3d at 586. 
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II. Legal Background 
 Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), all 
federal agencies must prepare an EIS for any major federal action that 
will affect the environment.35 The EIS must include alternatives to the 
proposed project, unavoidable harmful impacts, and assurance of the 
project’s sustainable use of the environment.36 NEPA mandates a pro-
cedure for federal entities and is intended to bring environmental con-
sequences to the forefront of all major agency actions.37 Through in-
creased visibility and community awareness, NEPA can lead to adoption 
of environmentally preferable choices.38 
 Other statutes can direct how agencies select a preferred alterna-
tive in developing an EIS, as required by NEPA.39 For example, § 4(f) of 
the Department of Transportation Act—applying to public parks, rec-
reation areas, wildlife refuges, and some other publicly owned lands— 
restricts DOT from using such land unless “no feasible and prudent 
alternative” exists.40 In Overton Park, the Supreme Court found § 4(f)’s 
language prohibited use of such land absent “truly unusual factors.”41 
The Court reasoned that Congress intended to afford special protec-
tion to parks, as such lands lacked a built-in constituency who would be 
directly injured by its use for a highway project.42 
 In the AAIA, Congress directed the manner in which FAA evalu-
ates an EIS of a runway extension.43 In § 47106, Congress specified that 
FAA must select the environmentally preferred alternative unless “no 
possible and prudent alternative to the project exists and . . . every rea-
sonable step has been taken to minimize the adverse effect[s].”44 By 
requiring FAA to choose the most environmentally friendly option, 
Congress signaled that agency decision-making should be constrained 
by environmental considerations to the extent possible and prudent to 
                                                                                                                      
35 43 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006). 
36 Id. 
37 See Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.3d 190, 193–94 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
38 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. FAA (NRDC ), 564 F.3d 549, 556 (2d Cir. 2009); 
Busey, 938 F.3d at 193–94. 
39 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 303 (2006); 49 U.S.C. § 47106(c)(1)(B) (2006); Busey, 938 F.3d 
at 206 (discussing NEPA’s procedural requirement for developing alternatives and AAIA’s 
substantive requirement for selecting a preferred alternative). 
40 49 U.S.C. § 303. 
41 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe (Overton Park), 401 U.S. 402, 413 
(1971). 
42 See id. at 412. 
43 See 49 U.S.C. § 47101(c)(1). 
44 Id. § 47106(c)(1)(B). 
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meet project objectives.45 Such a mandate demonstrates concern for 
environmental impacts while also meeting the AAIA’s goals of increas-
ing capacity and reducing delays at airports.46 
 When evaluating an agency’s interpretation of a statute it adminis-
ters, courts engage in a two-step Chevron analysis.47 At Chevron step one, 
courts determine if Congress unambiguously directed an agency to act 
in carrying out a statute.48 If the statute is ambiguous, leaving room for 
agency expertise and interpretation in the execution of a statutory 
mandate, courts move to step two and will defer to that interpretation 
so long as it is reasonable.49 Therefore, a Chevron analysis would require 
the D.C. Circuit in City of Dania Beach to assess if Congress was ambigu-
ous in using the word “prudent” in § 47106 and, if so, whether FAA’s 
interpretation was reasonable.50 
 To ensure compliance with NEPA requirements for airport actions, 
FAA developed an interpretive manual through notice and comment, 
Order 5050.4B (Order).51 In the Order, FAA offers guidance on EISs 
for projects covered by § 47106 and other statutes, including § 4(f) of 
the Department of Transportation Act, which protects parks and other 
sites of local, state, or national significance.52 Although the two statutes 
address different land types, the Order indicates that when determin-
ing the prudence of an option under § 47106, FAA’s discussion of the 
term “prudent” as applied to § 4(f) projects is “very useful.”53 To de-
termine whether a project is “prudent” under § 4(f), the Order out-
                                                                                                                      
45 See City of Dania Beach v. FAA, 628 F.3d 581, 588 (D.C. Cir. 2010); NRDC, 564 F.3d at 
565. 
46 See 49 U.S.C § 47101 (2006); City of Dania Beach, 628 F.3d at 588. 
47 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000); see Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 840, 866 (1984). 
48 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 132. 
49 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001); Brown & Williamson, 529 
U.S. at 132. 
50 See 628 F.3d at 586. 
51 NRDC, 564 F.3d at 563. The Order is an agency manual that provides guidelines and di-
rection for agency officials in carrying out the AAIA’s statutory mandate. FAA., Order 
5050.4B: National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Implementing Instructions for 
Airport Actions, at Intro.-1 (2006), available at http://www.faa.gov/airports/resources/public 
ations/orders/environmental_5050_4/media/5050–4B_complete.pdf [hereinafter Order]. 
52 49 U.S.C. § 303(c) (2006); Order, supra note 51, at 10-9 to -10. Section 47106 ap-
plies to any airport expansion or construction project, which could include areas covered 
by § 4(f). Order, supra note 51, at 10-10. Section 4(f) applies to “publicly owned land of a 
public park, recreation area, or wildlife and waterfowl refuge of national, State, or local 
significance, or land of an historic site of national, State, or local significance (as deter-
mined by the Federal, State, or local officials having jurisdiction over the park . . .).” 
§ 303(c). 
53 See Order, supra note 51, at 10-9 to -10. 
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lines seven questions an official should consider, all involving extraor-
dinary problems.54 Thus, the Order’s guidance follows the holding of 
Overton Park and sets a high bar for finding an alternative imprudent 
under § 4(f).55 
 While the Chevron doctrine applies to agency interpretations of 
statutory language, other cases provide guidance on the level of defer-
ence courts should provide other agency actions.56 In Auer v. Robbins, 
the Supreme Court upheld the interpretation of a regulation regarding 
overtime exemptions because the interpretation was fair, reasonable, 
and lawful.57 This highly deferential standard holds that an agency’s 
interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation deserves deference to 
the extent it is reasonable and in accordance with the statute.58 
 In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Ser-
vices, the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s claim that Chevron 
analysis did not apply when a previous case held a statutory term was 
ambiguous but offered a preferred definition.59 The Court held a lower 
court’s prior interpretation of a statutory term only trumps a later 
agency statutory construction otherwise deserving Chevron deference if 
the prior court found the statute unambiguous.60 Concerned that judi-
cially imposed definitions of vague words would preclude agencies 
                                                                                                                      
54 See id. at 10-10. The seven questions agency officials are to consider are: 
1. Does it meet the project’s purpose and need? 
2. Does it cause extraordinary safety or operational problems? 
3. Are there unique problems or truly unusual factors present with the alter-
native? 
4. Does it cause unacceptable and severe adverse social, economic, or other 
environmental impacts? 
5. Does it cause extraordinary community disruption? 
6. Does it cause added construction, maintenance, or operational costs of an 
extraordinary magnitude? or 
7. Does it result in an accumulation of factors that collectively, rather than in-
dividually, have adverse impacts that present unique problems or reach ex-
traordinary magnitudes? 
Id. 
55 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 413; Order, supra note 51, at 10–10. 
56 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court 
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1098 
(2008). 
57 See 519 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1997). 
58 Id. at 461. 
59 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005). 
60 Id. 
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from interpreting vague statutes, the Court noted that “it is for agen-
cies, not courts, to fill statutory gaps.”61 
 In addition, FAA previously faced challenges to its approvals of 
runway expansion plans.62 Prior to City of Dania Beach, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit heard a similar case, Natural 
Resources Defense Council v. FAA.63 Challenging FAA’s decision to relocate 
an airport through an emergency motion to stay, petitioners argued 
Overton Park barred FAA’s consideration of non-environmental factors 
to determine prudence.64 Although the Supreme Court established the 
parameters for determining prudence under § 4(f), the Second Circuit 
held this definition did not extend to § 47106.65 Despite use of the 
same word, differences in the types of lands implicated,66 the nature of 
the projects,67 and the built-in constituencies that would be directly af-
fected by the land use68 precluded applying the same definition.69 
 Petitioners in City of Dania Beach echoed the argument in NRDC, 
claiming that “prudent” was not an ambiguous term.70 Under this view, 
a court’s inquiry would stop at Chevron step one without considering 
whether FAA’s interpretation was reasonable.71 
III. Analysis 
 The court in City of Dania Beach dismissed petitioners’ claims, as 
jurisprudence under both Chevron and Auer support deference to 
agency interpretation of ambiguous words.72 Although the concur-
rence looks to legislative history to show the Overton Park definition of 
“prudent” should apply, the two statutes in question address different 
                                                                                                                      
61 Id. 
62 See, e.g., NRDC, 564 F.3d at 551–52. 
63 See id. 
64 Id. at 554, 565. 
65 Id. at 566. 
66 Id. (comparing public parks with “any land with natural resources”). 
67 Id. (comparing the relative ease of siting highway projects with the complexity of sit-
ing airports). 
68 NRDC, 564 F.3d at 566. (comparing community costs of use parkland with the high-
er immediate cost of using private land). 
69 Id. 
70 See City of Dania Beach, 628 F.3d at 586. 
71 See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 132; City of Dania Beach, 628 F.3d at 586. 
72 City of Dania Beach v. FAA, 628 F.3d 581, 586–87, 589 (D.C. Cir., 2010); see FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000). 
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resources and types of land.73 Although both statutes pertain to trans-
portation projects, their differences require flexibility in implementa-
tion.74 
 Petitioners pointed to Overton Park, where the Supreme Court 
found a project under § 4(f) was only imprudent when extraordinary 
and unusual issues were present.75 Arguing that the two uses of the 
word were linked by both common sense and by the Order, petitioners 
claimed FAA’s dismissal of Alternative C1 was thus an arbitrary or ca-
ici
pted FAA’s laxer interpretation of 
e t
environmental defects of the environmentally preferred option, but 
                                                                                                                     
pr ous decision in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.76 
 Although the court remarked that petitioners had a “seemingly 
common sense” argument that the words should have the same mean-
ing, the difference in the type of land covered by the two statutes cre-
ated a distinction which thwarted application of a common defini-
tion.77 Section 4(f) applies to public lands without a necessarily strong 
constituency, warranting a stricter meaning for finding an alternative 
not “prudent.”78 In contrast, § 47106 applies to any lands involved in an 
airport expansion project, including private lands with a built-in pro-
tective interest.79 Thus, the court acce
th erm “prudent” under § 47106.80 
 Noting that all proposed alternatives had some environmental im-
pact, the court found FAA could consider non-environmental impact 
when determining its preferred alternative.81 Because FAA engaged in 
this balancing test, FAA’s finding that Alternative C1 was imprudent was 
itself not arbitrary or capricious.82 Indeed, the difference in environ-
mental impacts between the two options was relatively minimal—0.01 
acres of wetland—so the agency decision rested on meeting project 
goals.83 The court noted “that where protected resources are on both 
sides of the balance, the FAA may properly consider not only the non-
 
73 See 49 U.S.C. § 303(c) (2006); 49 U.S.C. § 47106(c)(1)(B) (2006); City of Dania 
Beach, 628 F.3d. at 593 (Rogers, J., concurring); Natural Res. Def. Council v. FAA (NRDC ), 
564 F.3d 549, 566 (2d Cir. 2009). 
74 See City of Dania Beach, 628 F.3d. at 587. 
75 See id. at 586. 
76 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006); City of Dania Beach, 628 F.3d at 586, 588. 
77 See City of Dania Beach, 628 F.3d at 586–87. 
78 See id. at 587. 
79 Id. at 587. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 588. 
82 See id. at 589. 
83 City of Dania Beach, 628 F.3d. at 588. 
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also the margin by which its environmental advantages exceed those of 
the alternative.”84 
 The City of Dania Beach court also considered petitioners’ argu-
ment that the Order gave the same definition to “prudent” in § 4(f) 
and § 47106.85 FAA argued that, although the Order explained the test 
for a prudent alternative under § 4(f) was helpful for a similar calcula-
tion under § 47106, it “[did] not equate the two.”86 When evaluating 
agency interpretations of its own regulations, courts employ the Auer 
test of deference, deferring to an agency interpretation if reasonable, 
consistent, and not only advanced for litigation purposes.87 In evaluat-
ing FAA’s argument, the court looked to NRDC, where that court found 
the Overton Park definition of “prudent” did not control the definition 
under § 47106.88 In its brief in NRDC, FAA also demonstrated that the 
Order did not equate the two uses of “prudent.”89 Because FAA dem-
onstrated its argument in City of Dania Beach was consistent, reasoned, 
and not a post hoc rationalization, the D.C. Circuit upheld FAA’s inter-
pretation.90 
                                                                                                                     
 Finding FAA’s determination that Alternative C1 was imprudent 
under § 47106 permissible under administrative law jurisprudence, the 
court rejected petitioner’s challenge to selection of Alternative B1b.91 
The court’s decision is in line with NRDC, which promotes judicial def-
erence to an agency’s reasoned, consistent, and forward-looking inter-
pretation.92 Such deference meets the Administrative Procedure Act’s 
mandate for courts to overturn agency actions that are “arbitrary, ca-
pricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law” by restricting actions outside the spirit and letter of the law while 
still permitting flexibility.93 
 In a dissent in part and concurrence in the judgment, Judge 
Rogers rejected the majority’s argument regarding the definition of 
“prudent.”94 Instead, he argued § 47106 and § 4(f) shared a “common 
 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 586. 
86 Id. 
87 See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1997). 
88 City of Dania Beach, 628 F.3d at 586–87. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
91 See id. at 586, 591. 
92 See id. at 587. 
93 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227–28 
(2001). 
94 City of Dania Beach, 628 F.3d at 592–93 (Rogers, J., concurring). 
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raison d’etre” and thus should be afforded the same meaning.95 Fur-
ther, he stated that FAA’s own linking of the term “prudent” in the Or-
der also demonstrated that the § 4(f) definition of “prudent” should 
apply to § 47106 decisions.96 Judge Rogers cited Supreme Court cases 
encouraging finding the same meaning.97 
 The cases cited by Judge Rogers, however, only applied to a court’s 
interpretation of a statutory phrase, not an agency’s.98 When Congress 
entrusts an agency to administer a statute, courts have recognized that 
a thorough, consistent, and careful articulation by the agency should 
receive some form of deference.99 Failure to consider the agency’s posi-
tion could encroach upon the separation of powers that protects the 
legislative branch’s ability to delegate lawmaking authority pursuant to 
an “intelligible principle” free from judicial overriding.100 
 Despite Judge Rogers’s argument, the court’s decision best sup-
ports the Supreme Court’s avoidance of rigid, judicially-imposed defini-
tions in areas where a court is not the expert.101 Judge Rogers argues 
that the term “prudent” should be given the same definition as estab-
lished by the Court in Overton Park, as Congress did not expressly re-
quire a different meaning for the word.102 However, just as Congress 
did not require a different meaning, the AAIA and its legislative history 
does not demonstrate the word was used with a specific purpose.103 The 
Supreme Court in Brand X noted that Chevron’s premise “is for agen-
                                                                                                                      
95 Id. at 593 (Rogers, J., concurring) (quoting Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. of Memphis 
City Sch., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973)). 
96 Id. at 593 (Rogers, J., concurring). 
97 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 84–85 (2006); 
Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233–34 (2005); Northcross, 412 U.S. at 427. 
98 City of Dania Beach, 628 F.3d at 593 (Rogers, J., concurring); see Merrill Lynch, 547 
U.S. at 84–85 (addressing various court interpretations of a securities statute); Smith, 544 
U.S. at 233–34 (addressing court interpretation of statutory age discrimination language); 
Northcross, 412 U.S. 427 (addressing a court’s interpretation of a statute regarding attor-
ney’s fees). 
99 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 228. 
100 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 
(2005); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (quoting J. W. Hampton, Jr., & 
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928)). 
101 See Eskridge, supra note 56, at 1144. 
102 City of Dania Beach, 628 F.3d at 593 (Rogers, J., concurring) (“Congress gave no in-
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cies, not courts, to fill statutory gaps.”104 Allowing courts to extend 
definitions to control similar words in separate statutes would calcify 
portions of statutory law whereas continued flexibility allows more cus-
tomized and practical results.105 
 From a policy perspective, allowing regulatory flexibility across 
administrative agencies can lead to environmental benefits.106 Such 
flexibility permits agencies to utilize subject matter expertise to meet an 
individual project’s goals.107 Just as FAA, an expert in aviation issues, 
receives deference on aviation issues under current administrative law 
jurisprudence, EPA receives deference on environmental issues.108 Al-
lowing courts to freeze definitions of statutory terms would undercut 
the authority of all agencies, including EPA.109 Further, such deference 
allows agencies to make judgments tailored to the nuances of an issue, 
such as City of Dania Beach’s drastic difference in delay reduction and 
increased capacity compared with the minor difference in environ-
mental impacts between alternatives.110 
 Overton Park applied to protection of public parks and other sig-
nificant lands, where low costs for building mandated a high threshold 
for finding imprudence.111 As the vigorous opposition from local citi-
zens and nearby municipalities regarding the FLL runway expansion 
demonstrates, each alternative considered has vocal supporters and 
detractors, helping ensure all sides would be fairly heard.112 The mean-
ing of “prudent” is contextual, and Congress delegated authority to 
FAA to best determine how to incorporate this environmental consid-
eration to carry out the AAIA.113 
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Conclusion 
 While the term “prudent” was used in both § 4(f) of the Depart-
ment of Transportation Act and § 47106 of the AAIA, the scope of the 
statutes, the length of time between their enactment, and FAA’s recog-
nition and accounting for this difference in its own regulations all sup-
port the majority’s holding that the terms should not be given the same 
meaning.114 Congress delegated to FAA the authority to carry out the 
AAIA, incorporating environmental considerations.115 In using a rela-
tively common word, “prudent,” FAA has consistently recognized a 
similarity between considerations under both § 4(f) of the Department 
of Transportation Act and § 47106 of the AAIA, but has articulated that 
the two should be treated differently.116 
 As Supreme Court precedent demonstrates that agencies, not 
courts, should fill statutory gaps, upholding FAA’s decision speaks to 
the larger goal of maintaining regulatory flexibility.117 In the long term, 
such flexibility will allow an agency to provide the informed judgment 
upon which its expertise is based.118 
 
114 See supra notes 63–68 and accompanying text. 
115 See 49 U.S.C § 47106(c)(1) (2006). 
116 See City of Dania Beach v. FAA, 628 F.3d 581, 586–87 (D.C. Cir., 2010). 
117 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 
(2005). 
118 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227–28 (2001). 
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